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4 In  2002  the  science  fiction  film  Minority  Report  was  released.  Directed  by  Steven
Spielberg with a screenplay written by Scott Frank and Jon Cohen, the film is loosely
based on the 1956 novel The Minority Report, authored by Philip Dick. The film largely
depicts a future society set in the year 2054 where a division of the police department
called PreCrime, utilize psychics, referred to as precogs, to identify and later arrest
individuals who are in the process of committing crimes. Most interesting, however, is
the film’s depiction of surveillance that is conducted by state authorities and corporate
entities.  All  citizens  are  easily  tracked  and  identified  through  various  types  of
surveillance technology. In one scene a small swarm of artificially intelligent ‘spiders’
are deployed into an apartment building to locate a suspect using retinal eye-scanning.
It is a rather unnerving scene, seeing these almost fully autonomous ‘spiders’ weaving
their way throughout the building, slipping into each apartment, locating ‘targets’, and
then carrying out identification protocols on each and every resident. After reading
Killer Apps, I came to realize that we will not need to wait for 2054 in order to see the
application of  such technologies  showcased in  Minority  Report,  it  is  already here  or
within our reach. 
5 I would be kidding readers, however, if I did not admit that this is a book that poses
some real challenges. Killer Apps: War, Media, Machine is an ambitious book that is quite
timely in the array of topics addressed and the issues raised in its pages. Jeremy Packer
and Joshua Reeves grapple with the contours and implications of automated warfare
and the evolving role of media systems in enhancing military efficiency through the
use of artificial intelligence. Layered into most of this volume’s chapters is coverage of
military history and key aspects of military strategy and tactics. With such topics under
scrutiny it should hardly be a surprise that the use of military jargon and technical
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terminology are present throughout the volume. Compounding this is the authors’ use
of theoretical  discourses of the postmodern/post-structuralist  variety.  Either one of
these points is not problematic per se; it is simply an observation that some readers will
find agreeable while others will find demanding. As the authors make clear, Killer Apps
uses  media  theory  “as  a  lens  to  analyze  the  history  of  warfare,  the  rationality  of
weapons development, and US military roadmaps in order to better understand the
political implications of this convergence of AI and war…” (4). Structurally, the book
includes an introduction, a conclusion, and nine chapters that address topics that are
directly linked to the domain of  military affairs  and strategic  practices,  along with
other  chapters  that  explore  the  nexus  between  the  military  and  environmental
conditions,  cyberwarfare,  as  well  as  a  chapter  on  unidentified  flying  objects.  In
addition, the volume includes numerous illustrations, charts, and tables that convey
helpful information to the reader in a comprehendible manner. 
6 Any cursory look at military history reveals that leaders, officers, and strategists have
always looked for some means to outmaneuver the enemy and gain even the slightest
advantage  on  the  battlefield.  The  development  of  a  new  weapon  or  tactic  could
determine the difference between victors and defeated. This process became even more
significant  after  key  mechanical  developments  associated  with  the  industrial
revolutions of the nineteenth century. As the authors make clear, at present, militaries
around the world are seeking to develop technological innovation in the full array of
parameters  in  command,  control,  communications,  as  well  as computer  and
information  technologies.  Central  in  contemporary  developments  are  media
technologies. Many who speculate about the nature of future wars see “computation,
unmanned  vehicles,  swarm  warfare,  smart  weapons,  autonomous  missile  defense
systems and artificial intelligence at the forefront of next-generation military strategy”
(2). Foremost for Packer and Reeves and prevalent throughout the volume, is their use
of  the  term  media  technologies.  Their  approach  in  this  study,  they  point  out,  is
mediacentric. Specifically, they are referring to “those technologies that offer different
manipulations  of  the  time/space  axis,  thus  ushering  in  new  political  realities  and
military  velocities  through  their  unique  capacities  to  select,  store,  and  process
information” (2). In short, they are referring to specific technologies that center on the
collection, storage, processing, and communication of information through the chain of
military  command.  Since  the  1990s  and especially  during the  US declared “war  on
terror,”  we  have  witnessed  the  deployment  of  various  types  of  weapons  systems
including smart bombs, unmanned vehicles, and other tactical weapons operating in
real time. It might be fair to say, as the authors argue, that at present we have moved
beyond the  twentieth century conception of  the  “military-industrial  complex,”  and
have entered a new dynamic identified as the “military-media complex.” Specifically,
what lies on the horizon are developments relating to the use of autonomous media
technologies and artificial intelligence in the battlefield context. Artificially intelligent
weapons,  for  example,  include self-guided munitions and autonomous drones.  Such
weapons respond to and take measures against the enemy in accordance to the rules of
military engagement. This encompasses the determination of given targets resulting
from perceived threats,  and the ability to utilize lethal force either without human
inputs or with a limited degree of interaction between the human and the autonomous
weapons system.
7 The decreasing role or elimination of the human in determining friend from foe on the
battlefield will mark a major and dramatic development in how wars are carried out in
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the near future. This “third revolution” in warfare, the first two being gunpowder and
nuclear weapons respectively, will be centered on the uses and application of artificial
intelligence.  Militaries  will  need  to  reformulate  their  structural  organization,
infrastructure, and hierarchies of command and control from one of centralization to a
new paradigm based on decentralization and autonomy in order to accommodate the
operational capacities of AI. The marginalization of the soldier in this “third revolution”
is premised on the notion that humans are prone to make errors. But it is not only that,
as  Packer  and  Reeves  make  clear.  Since  humans  are  “beset  with  psychological,
biological, affective, and medialogical vulnerabilities―that is because of their soft skin,
brittle bones, susceptibility to psychological trauma, and pitiful capacities to capture,
store, and process information―the human is widely recognized as an unfit soldier for
the  twenty-first  century”  (16).  Clearly,  these  are  strong  arguments  for  the
implementation of AI in military applications. The authors really convey this rather
convincingly in specific references to the physical limitations of the human body in
military engagement. However, it is not only about organs that are damaged beyond
repair, bones that easily break, or skin and tissue that is easily torn. They also discuss
human psychological and behavioral qualities that are hindered as a result of the war
experience.  Human susceptibility “to shock,  fear,  and depression;  their unreliability
and forgetfulness; their need for sleep and nourishment; their ethical attachments and
moral hesitations; their inevitable deaths…” (18). These last couple points in this quote
are  most  relevant  to  the  discussion  at  hand,  specifically  the  references  to  “ethical
attachments  and  moral  hesitations.”  The  potential  creation  and  deployment  of
autonomous weapons systems that would not be impeded in any manner by ethical or
moral concerns in a theater of warfare is at best an alarming prospect. If we consider
just momentarily the history of wars over the past two-hundred years we could observe
that it would be hard to identify a war in which some kind of war atrocity did not
occur. In many cases, war atrocities occurred in spite of the existence of international
laws banning such practices  as  outlined in  the  Hague Conventions  and the  Geneva
Conventions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the mere
existence of such codes on war conduct, one might argue, limited the perpetration of
war  crimes  due  to  fear  of  prosecution.  In  addition,  individual  behavior  in  the  war
setting for a percentage of officers and soldiers is  dictated by particular moral and
ethical precepts. One, therefore, may ask the following question: in future wars will
artificially intelligent weapons systems be familiar with or concerned about the Geneva
Conventions? 
8 The authors ask an interesting question at the end of the volume: “When AI tires of
simply beating us at chess, what other games will it have in mind?” (174). There are
many who view this question with little concern. Holding an anthropocentric view,
they believe that AI is and can be in the future controlled by humans. Taking their lead
from Marshall McLuhan, they view media simply as extensions of humankind. On the
other hand, some would argue that AI represents an existential threat to our society
and  way  of  life.  In  short,  machines  “have  an  innate  political  determination  to
succeed―even if that means fighting, deceiving, and eliminating any human obstacles
they encounter  along the  way” (100).  This  debate  is  well  developed by Packer  and
Reeves,  and it  contributes  to  building a  more despairing atmosphere as  the reader
approaches the conclusion of the book. As they suggest in clear terms, it is unlikely that
humans will be able to impose their visions onto AI. Instead, “media technologies have
imposed  their  politics  on  us,  remaking  humans  in  their image”  (102).  One  might
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therefore wonder what the consequences of AI on war will be as militaries around the
world begin incorporating autonomous weapons systems into their arsenals. Will we
not strive to create perfect killing machines that will be free of all the shortcomings,
weaknesses, and failings of the modern warrior? In the 1987 British-American war film,
Full Metal Jacket, directed by Stanley Kubrick, there is an interesting scene where the
military recruits are preparing for graduation prior to their mobilization in Vietnam.
As the soldiers  run through the mud and grass  in  slow motion the narration is  as
follows: “The Marine Corps does not want robots. The Marine Corps wants killers. The
Marine Corps wants to build indestructible men. Men without fear.” Apparently, the
military  does  want  “robots,”  and  is  aggressively  moving  toward  utilizing  media
technologies and weapons that are increasingly autonomous and artificially intelligent
in their design and architecture. What exactly the implications of this will be is not
entirely  clear  yet  to  many.  For  Packer  and  Reeves,  however,  they  put  forth  the
following  warning.  Every  new  media  innovation brings  new  risks  and  “new
opportunities for exploiting the natural world, and new methods of destruction, thus
driving  the  development  of  new  instruments  of  death  and  coercion.  Every  media
revolution ushers forth new methods of slaughter” (9).
9 This statement, unfortunately, is both disturbing and true. And it appears to this reader
to  be  the  case  with  the  vast  majority  of  content  in  Killer  Apps.  Through  a  careful
presentation of technological developments in the domain of military affairs, coupled
with a rigorous historical analysis, an effective application of media theory, and a vast
array  of  case  studies,  Jeremy  Packer  and  Joshua  Reeves  convincingly  present  an
account of how we arrived where we are today in a world on the cusp of embracing new
forms  of  executing  war  that  will  be  largely  dependent  on  AI.  Will,  this  “third
revolution” in warfare usher in new and more horrific ways of slaughter? If history is
any lesson, and as the authors of Killer Apps appear to suggest, as long as war persists
and nation-states continue to compete with one another for power and influence in
global  affairs,  so  will  the  desire  for  technological-military  superiority  persevere  in
future wars. 
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